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1. Introduction
Intersex in Church documents on sexuality has, thus far, been given very little coverage in its own right. This may be largely due to a lack of awareness about the prevalence and significance of intersex.​[1]​ However, intersex is sometimes presented as a kind of a foil to transgender – as a ‘natural’ if unfortunate condition, in contrast to the ‘chosen’ (or at least resolutely ‘non-biological’) state of transgender. But utilizing opposites such as biological/non-biological is not, in fact, the most useful way to represent the relationship between intersex and transgender. Rather, it must be acknowledged that both conditions profoundly undermine the givenness of certainty and either/or tropes when it comes to sex identity at all. In this article I give a brief summary of some occurrences of the unproblematized contrasting of intersex and transgender in certain Church statements, and suggest that they are being contrasted in the wrong ways.
There is worthy precedent in the Christian tradition for exploring the transcendent, multiple nature of embodiment. Although sex-gender identity has latterly come to be considered something largely immovable and immutable, there is evidence that this has not always been the case (see, for example, Laqueur 1990 and Gilbert 2002). Although it is anachronistic to project contemporary constructions of sexuality and gender identity back onto communities which understood them very differently, it is important to recognize that even Christians have not always understood maleness and femaleness, masculinity and femininity as either-or, mutually-exclusive categories in exactly the ways that we might suppose. Caroline Walker Bynum, Sarah Coakley, Michael Nausner and others have usefully reflected on unusual or even overtly ‘gender-bending’ figurings of gender in the medieval mystics, in Gregory of Nyssa and elsewhere (see, for example, Bynum 1986; Coakley 2002: 127-9; Nausner 2002). What this means is that ‘queer’, transgressive and ‘crossing’ bodies are always already present to theology in its own past, and that ‘atypical’ intersexed or transsexual bodies therefore already map onto the mixed-up, much-inscribed Body of Christ. These bodies’ distinct, specific existences can speak to what all bodies mean in relation to one another, despite and because of their unusual or statistically rare (and therefore particular) statuses.
As well as these hints in its own tradition, Christianity must take proper account of work going on in other disciplines which disrupts and problematizes a heteronormative and biologically-essentialist matrix for human sex-gender identity. Georgia Warnke, for example, has convincingly shown that to call certain characteristics monolithically ‘sexed’ as either male or female is as problematic as calling certain other characteristics ‘raced’ (Warnke 2001).​[2]​ Although we might have come to associate the term ‘sex’ with biology and the term ‘gender’ with culture, the particular characteristics we choose to imbue with sexed meaning have shifted over time and are likely to shift again: Thomas Laqueur argues that it has been changes in cultural assumptions about the significance of masculinity and femininity which have led to shifts in figuring maleness and femaleness, not the other way around (Laqueur 1990).
Despite all this, however, Christianity’s recent concern with discrete and stable sex-gender identities has meant that Church statements on sexuality since the 1990s have almost universally understood shifts or ambiguities in sex-gender as pathological or at least less than ideal. The apparently unproblematized linking of transsexualism with psychological disturbance and sin is evident in documents such as Issues in Human Sexuality, the 1991 statement by the Church of England’s House of Bishops. 
2. Church of England: Issues in Human Sexuality
Issues in Human Sexuality is extremely heteronormative throughout, presenting the monogamous, heterosexual married couple as the unproblematized ideal (Church of England 1991: 9). In this light, it may be considered unsurprising that anyone who elects to ‘compromise’ their capacity to marry and to bear children should be thought of as perverse. As might have been predicted, transsexualism itself is addressed in Issues entirely in one short paragraph which also deals with the ‘problems’ of sex addiction and those who find genital sex difficult or impossible (such conflation being revealing in itself, with its implication that transsexualism bears reflection only as a discomfiting curiosity). The statement reinforces throughout its early assertion that ‘sin can disturb the delicate balance of the man-woman partnership’ (Church of England 1991: 7). As such, transsexualism can only be understood as arising from and being symptomatic of this sin: 

Human sexuality is a very fragile system, easily distorted and broken. There have always been a certain number of both men and women … whose sexuality feels to them at odds with their bodies, so that they become convinced of their need for sex change, or enter the world of the transvestite. Damage to sexuality, sometimes irreversible, can be done very early in life. The personality is given a twist which puts normal sex out of reach. (Church of England 1991: 26-7) 

The whole, brief discussion of transgender is sandwiched between the languages of damage and perversion. But the paragraph’s treatment of the topic falls short for other reasons than this. Appealing to a ‘sexuality’ which ‘feels … at odds with their bodies’ is a strange phrasing, and telling in its strangeness. Surely it is their gender that transgendered people find to be at odds with their bodies, and not specifically their sexuality? A male who found himself exclusively attracted to men would be unlikely to assume as a first step that he was in the ‘wrong’ body; rather, the majority of such men would identify as homosexual. This, however, is where the statement’s overweening heteronormativity is so limiting: since Issues cannot conceive of homosexuality as a fully legitimate identity, it cannot think it into the minds of those whose experiences it purports to present either. Undoubtedly, the ‘normal sex’ which is put out of reach here is the kind of sex which happens between a male man and a female woman, ideally within a marriage.
But why is this attitude which considers heterosexual, penetrative sexual intercourse the norm, and any variation from it deviant or inadequate, quite so strong? This becomes evident later in the document: the a priori given to which other factors must be subsumed is gender complementarity:

It is important for the mature development both of individual men and women and of society that each person should come to understand and to value … complementarity … The fact that heterosexual unions in the context of marriage and the family are of such importance for the fostering of true man-woman complementarity seems to us to confirm their essential place in God’s given order. (Church of England 1991: 37-8)

This obsession with complementarity means that human identity is caricatured, ‘immature’ development (which presumably means any non-standard understanding of sexuality and gender) stigmatized, and difference pinned solely on sex rather than on any of the other elements contributing to the tension of sameness and difference within which human interaction takes place:

In heterosexual love... personal bonding and mutual self-giving happen between two people who, because they are of different gender, are not merely physically differentiated but also diverse in their emotional, mental and spiritual lives. (Church of England 1991: 37) (my emphasis)

In fact, this is a grossly inadequate representation of otherness. Whilst gender is important as a repository for identity through which difference and diversity are expressed, it is not the most fundamental thing about being human, nor the only thing in which difference inheres.
Intersex is not acknowledged in Issues at all, and so cannot be contrasted with transgender, adequately or otherwise. However, it is important to note the worldview and attitude to transgender – and to sexuality more broadly – assumed in Issues since these underlie the fuller 2003 document Some Issues in Human Sexuality. What we can take from this brief look at Issues is its profoundly heteronormative bent, and its deep investment in gender complementarity as providing the correct basis for human sexual relationships. This is particularly important because it hints at the kinds of background work most valued by the compilers of Issues and Some Issues. 

3. Church of England: Some Issues in Human Sexuality (I): Holder
Some Issues contains a whole chapter focusing on transsexualism, and briefly acknowledges intersex too. Given the norms and ideals reflected in Issues it is unsurprising that the chapter in Some Issues draws so heavily on work by Rodney Holder, who also extols complementarity as virtue and ideal. In his two short essays, Holder is keen to distinguish transsexualism from what he calls ‘other conditions of ambivalent sexuality’ (Holder 1998a: 90), in which he includes intersex. It seems evident that this has influenced the writers of Some Issues. Of course, scholars and activists working in intersex in the last two decades have often been keen themselves to stress that intersex and transgender are different phenomena, and that for transgendered people to annex intersex support groups claiming that they are intersexed is inappropriate. For example, the webpage of the Androgen Insensitivity Society Support Group insists,

Intersex is not the same as a transsexual (gender dysphoria) or as a transgender state. Neither term is one that we recognise as belonging in any general discussion of intersex. We are not happy with the recent tendency of some trans groups/people to promote transgender as an umbrella term to encompass, for example, transsexuality, transvestitism and intersex … This trend towards “muscling in” on intersex issues seems to be a initiative on the part of certain politically-minded people in the “trans” community, to bring intersex under their banner … or even to actively interfere in clinical issues relating to intersex. (http://www.aissg.org/21_overview.htm)

Part of the reluctance of AISSG and other intersexed people (see, for example, Koyama 2006) to be considered in the same breath as non-intersexed transpeople is because of the association of transgender with gender identity problems, which many intersexed people never face. Where one’s agency and selfhood are already likely to have been eroded by others (particularly medical professionals) seeking to impose unsolicited and even harmful ‘expertise’, the desire to maintain a distinction between intersex and transgender is justifiable and understandable. What, then, is wrong with Holder’s particular contrasting of the two conditions and the way it is taken up in Some Issues?
Holder’s division between intersex and transgender is based not in questions of biography but in questions of biology. Holder asserts that transsexualism stands ‘in contrast to hermaphroditism [i.e. intersex], which is a congenital disorder in which both male and female gonads are present and the external genitalia are not clearly male or female’ (Holder 1998a: 90). We see clearly here how intersex – in Holder’s terms, ‘hermaphroditism’, since he is somewhat confused in his vocabulary​[3]​ – is presented as a foil to transgender. Holder says that surgery for transgendered people is ‘in principle no different from that in the case of hermaphroditism’ (Holder 1998b: 129); his reasons for this assertion are grounded in the arguments of Oliver O’Donovan, which I examine below. Holder munificently acknowledges that although surgery cannot change the transsexual’s ‘prima facie birth sex’ (that is, the biological sex according to current conventions of what this comprises) any more than it can that of the ‘hermaphrodite’, social interaction and gender identity must be taken into account in both cases (Holder 1998b: 130). Holder himself therefore recognizes that some of the shared issues and overlaps between the conditions may mean intersex deserves more than a cursory engagement from theologians.
Significantly, however, although Holder himself is careful to entertain both biological and non-biological origins for transgender, and to outline carefully some of the moral implications for considering transgender a ‘psychological’ rather than a ‘physical’ condition (Holder 1998a: 92-4), Some Issues does not manage to be quite so open-minded. Some Issues uses Holder’s assertion about hermaphroditism specifically to demonstrate by contrast the unambiguous nature of transgendered people’s ‘biological sex’ (Church of England 2003: 223). There is no doubt, we are told, about their sex – since sex is assumed to be unproblematically physical and therefore ‘readable’ from physical characteristics, unless access to them has somehow been frustrated. However, as we see in Warnke and Laqueur (and as I discuss more fully later), such is not necessarily the case. Contrasting transgender and intersex solely on the grounds of whether or not particular biological pointers to sex are or are not evident therefore seems somewhat naïve.  
The way in which Holder’s work is used in Some Issues is largely to accept and recapitulate a series of unproblematized binaries: ambiguous/unambiguous, equivocal/unequivocal, and so on. For Some Issues, intersex unproblematically links with the former term and transgender with the latter – despite the fact that atypical genitalia need be figured as ‘ambiguous’ only if it is assumed that there is a real, solely-binary truth which they are failing to ‘tell’. In fact, accepting that categories of human sex work largely by convention, and that there may be huge variations within sexes as well as between them, means that holding intersex as somehow more ‘real’ or ‘legitimate’ than transgender (because intersex is a unique instance of indistinctness) is misguided. For Some Issues, the equivocal/unequivocal binary seems to be maintained largely because it reinforces the notion that sex-gender identity is not a human choice, but simply a foregone conclusion stemming from what the bishops term ‘God-givenness’. ‘God-givenness’ seems suspiciously heteronormative, since ‘healthy’ manifestations of gender are presented only as those which supervene on (unproblematized) biological sex, and promote gender-based complementarity. More engagement with scholarly work assuming a model of human sex and gender which is, at least in part, socially constructed, would have allowed for both a non-pathological understanding of transgender on the part of the bishops, and a recognition that contemporary understandings of biology are neither divinely-ordained nor set in stone. 

4. Evangelical Alliance: Transsexuality
	There are other problematic assumptions underlying Some Issues, too. It also draws heavily on Transsexuality, a 2000 report by the Evangelical Alliance Policy Commission which has become influential in its own right within evangelical churches. This document is particularly invested in presenting intersex as ‘natural’ (that is, based in genuine biological ‘ambiguity’) and transgender as ‘chosen’ (because the biology is understood as unproblematically pointing to a certain narrow conclusion), as we shall see. This seems to be done in order to bolster a heteronormative agenda and present non-heterosexual sexualities as illegitimate. Its handling of intersex is also telling, and the document is worth examining in some detail.
Transsexuality lists both ‘hermaphrodite’ and ‘intersex’ in its glossary. Although it is positive that distinctions between hermaphroditism and intersex have been drawn, since the two are still so often conflated, it is a shame that this was not done more accurately. These are the definitions of ‘hermaphrodite’ and ‘intersex’ as given by the Evangelical Alliance document:

Intersex: Refers to a number of rare medical conditions where people are born with ambiguous sexual characteristics, and nearly always due to physiological causes. Commonly, this may be shown by the presence of intermediate forms of external genitalia. Congenital adrenal hyperplasia, in which a girl is born with a masculinised clitoris, and chromosomal abnormalities such as Turner’s syndrome, are among the medical conditions known as “intersex”. When an intersex condition is present there is usually a clear physiological causal condition … Despite frequent arguments to the contrary, transsexuality should not be regarded as a genuine recognised “intersex” condition. Most biological investigations of transsexuals have found no abnormalities in chromosomal pattern, in the gonads (which include the internal and external sexual organs), or in sex hormone levels that could account for the condition. (Evangelical Alliance 2000: 3-4).

Hermaphrodite: One of a number of rare clear physiological causal medical congenital conditions where the sex of newly born babies is ambiguous due to the presence of gonads and genitalia of both sexes, such people being termed “hermaphrodites”. An individual with testicular feminisation syndrome, for example, appears normal at birth, but actually has testes as well as a clitoris. The condition is usually treated in early childhood by surgery and hormone therapy. (Evangelical Alliance 2000: 3).

I cite these definitions at length in order to show up the muddled and misleading thinking contained within them. Like Holder, the authors of this document have made the mistake of believing that ‘hermaphrodites’ have both gonads and genitalia associated with males and females. In fact, ‘true hermaphrodites’ (those with ovotestes, the only individuals to whom the unfortunate and outdated term ‘hermaphrodite’ may be applied with any degree of accuracy whatsoever) only very rarely have ambiguous genitalia. ‘Testicular feminization syndrome’ (an archaic term for the condition now known as Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome) is an example of intersex, but not of hermaphroditism as the EA suggests. Turner’s syndrome is a highly debated condition and is often not included under the umbrella of intersex, which makes it odd that the EA has chosen to highlight it particularly. Finally, referring to an individual with Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia as having a ‘masculinised clitoris’ (as opposed to one which is simply larger and more prominently hooded than average) is extremely controversial and betrays a dualistic, essentialist picture of sex, which stigmatizes difference. 
That the entry on intersex makes clear its ‘physiological causes’ is obviously deemed so important that it is repeated only two sentences later. It soon becomes clear why: this is the primary way in which intersex is contrasted with transsexuality, for which ‘most biological investigations’ have found no explanation. The entry for transsexualism stresses repeatedly that transsexual people are ‘biologically normal’; that there is ‘no doubt’ about their ‘actual biological sex’ (EA 2000: 5). Indeed, Some Issues takes this up straight away, repeating and reiterating that, ‘in the case of transsexuals, there is no doubt about their biological sex’ (Church of England 2003: 223). The implication is clear: since transsexualism is not biological, it can only be a psychological condition, and since ‘healthy’ psyches are heterosexual psyches, transgender must be a problem, a result of living in a sinful world. Likened to alcoholism (EA 2000: 20) and other forms of addiction (EA 2000: 26), it can therefore only be pathological. ‘[Transsexualism] is largely concerned with a state of mind … rather than any concrete set of facts’ (EA 2000: 38), claims the EA. This total dismissal of psychological states as having any kind of actuality is bizarre, and apotheosizes biological ‘truths’ to an extent which seems entirely unaware of any anti-essentialist criticism whatsoever. 
The sense in the EA document that conditions which are ‘merely’ psychological can be eradicated through therapy – even if some transgendered people may reject this (EA 2000: 23) – is a dangerous one. If swallowed, it implies they can be explained away and ‘disappeared’, rather than dealt with head-on as real and permanent aspects of identity. That one’s ‘state of mind’ cannot, in this account, be considered part of a ‘concrete set of facts’ about one’s integrated body-self is profoundly dualistic, and heightens the problematic distinction being drawn between ‘real’ and ‘false’ evidence about sex-gender identity. This is unfortunate, particularly since the writers of the EA document seem motivated by a genuine desire to ensure that people with gender dysphoria can access therapy for any underlying issues such as poor self-esteem, parental rejection and peer pressure, rather than being fobbed off by doctors who may see sex reassignment surgery as an easy fix (EA 2000: 26). But although counselling and extensive discussion are, of course, crucial precursors to sex reassignment surgery, the a priori assumption in this document (and in Issues) that gender dysphoria always means that the mind must be changed and not the body will colour the manner in which transgendered people are considered. Just because transgendered people cannot help being that way, states Some Issues, ‘this does not necessarily mean … that a transsexual person cannot come to accept his or her biological sex’ (Church of England 2003: 227). Biology is still the immutable a priori which must be ‘accepted’; not ‘accepting’ biology signals the beginnings of ‘a gnostic dualism in which the body is seen as separate from the self’ (Church of England 2003: 249). But holding as pre-existent ‘known fact’ that all transgendered people are mentally ill or delusional profoundly undermines their legitimacy as authors and actors of their own identities, and fails to disturb the genital-centric model of human sex which often seems to win through in the Church statements despite their acknowledgement of other models. 
The declaration in the EA document and in Some Issues that there is ‘no doubt’ about the biological sex of transgendered people is troubling for a still deeper and more profound reason. Such an assertion assumes that human sex is generally something which can be known without any doubt – that it is somehow beyond doubt, except in the case of ‘abnormal’ people. This is extremely problematic once we have recognized the provisional and arbitrary nature of all human sex assignment. Nobody can know for sure that the child born with testes and an acceptably-sized penis and who is assigned ‘boy’ accordingly will continue to identify as a boy and man as he grows up. Just because individuals usually stick to the assignments bestowed at birth, which have been reinforced throughout infancy and childhood, does not make the assignments any less provisional.  The fact is that, on our current understandings of sex, we happen to prize certain characteristics – namely, the appearance of the external genitalia of children at birth – above others. Unless there is any ‘ambiguity’ about these features, further investigation as to karyotype (that is, chromosomal configuration) or gonads is unlikely to occur until much later, if at all. (In cases of Androgen Insensitivity Syndrome, where children have male-related gonads and XY chromosomes, but also have female-related genitalia, the condition may not be identified at all until puberty when a girl does not begin to menstruate as expected.) As Warnke, Laqueur, Dreger, Gilbert and others have shown, sex has not always been assigned in exactly the same way as it is now. It is therefore conceivable that it will not be assigned this way forevermore, and that the particular ‘biological’ distinction which the Church documents tend to draw between intersex and transgender will no longer stand, because different biological or non-biological characteristics will have come into vogue as more significant signposts of sex. 
So the authors of Some Issues are, it might be said, just a little naïve in their insistence that ‘physiological and psychological factors are not susceptible to change in the same way as social factors’ (Church of England 2003: 226). Given that classification as intersexed, for instance, can depend on a difference of a few millimetres’ glans size, Morgan Holmes claims, ‘In a sense, “intersexuality” is nothing more than a perpetually shifting phantasm in the collective psyche of medicine and culture’ (Holmes 2002: 175).​[4]​ Moreover, as Preves and Kessler have noted, even the medical guidelines on what constitutes a too-large clitoris or a too-small penis at birth are not universal or unchanging (Preves 2003: 55; Kessler 1998: 38-40, 99-100). Thomas Laqueur, in Making Sex, provides a particularly well-known and thorough exploration of the ways in which the ways in which sex difference has been figured at given times in history, arguing that this has been ‘largely unconstrained by what was actually known about this or that bit of anatomy, this or that physiological process’, and ‘derive[s] instead from the rhetorical exigencies of the moment’ (Laqueur 1990: 243). He says, 

The history of the representation of the anatomical differences between man and woman is… extraordinarily independent of the actual structures of these organs or of what was known about them. Ideology, not accuracy of observation, determined how they were seen and which differences would matter. (Laqueur 1990: 88)

This goes for the ‘atypical’ genitalia associated with intersex as much as with ‘typical’ male-related and female-related genitals. 
The unquestioned privileging of genital-appearance-at-birth over other matrices of sex-gender identity can be clearly seen elsewhere in the EA report.  It is the reason why ‘sex-ambiguity’, on this account, can only be an intersex-linked occurrence and not a trans-linked one:

We need to start by distinguishing between sex-ambiguity as a physiological fact at birth (the phenomenon of the “intersex” or “hermaphrodite” state constituting examples of such ambiguity), and transsexual phenomena. Something which is ambiguous between two distinct things, and where ambiguity is regarded as bad, will need to be resolved if possible into one or other of these distinct possibilities; this process of resolution usually takes place in the rare individual cases of sex-ambiguity without “transsexual” issues ever arising. (Evangelical Alliance 2000: 58)

But what the report does not acknowledge is that intersex does not only exist as an example of something which stands between two distinct things; actually, it problematizes the model of their being two distinct things in the first place. Intersex shows that human sex is not a simple binary; and, since any exception to a dualistic model necessarily undermines the model in its entirety, this makes essentialist assumptions about what constitutes ‘concrete facts’ even more precarious.
The EA report, however, will not acknowledge this, insisting instead,

Sex is fundamental to being human; each person is, inevitably, male or female. Sometimes the process of sexual typology is not straightforward, as the “intersex” case has shown. But that merely confirms sexual typology to be a matter of interpretation of a reality distinct from the judgement made. (EA 2000: 63)

This, however, is a circular argument. It presupposes that the attempts to make intersexed bodies fit into a ‘typology’ at all are correct, and fails to ask whether the so-called ‘reality distinct from the judgement’ has itself neglected to take account of the ‘exceptions’, which may well turn out to be, after all, not so exceptional. There is no sense that the binary model of masculine maleness and feminine femaleness might be a provisional or inadequately narrow one. Indeed, and almost unbelievably, the report admits that even if it could one day be demonstrated that transsexualism were a kind of late-onset intersex, ‘the case for the essential givenness of sex, as argued in this report, would remain largely unchanged’ (EA 2000: 67).​[5]​ There seems to be an implication that any discovery of a ‘physical causation’ of transgender might necessitate ‘potential corrective physical or genetic treatment’ (EA 2000: 23). Ironically, given the repeated assertion that transsexualism is to be contrasted with the genuine biological state of intersex, it is very clear here that any new evidence about a biological basis for transsexualism is to be subsumed to the existing biblical witness – as it is interpreted – about the nature of human sex and gender (EA 2000: 48). As Adrian Thatcher comments in response to the use of Scripture in Some Issues, 

Genesis 1 and 2 are required to bear an impossible weight of interpretation … To say Genesis provides a “framework for understanding what it means for us to be male and female before God” is already to offer interpretation well beyond what the text itself is able to authorize. There need be no objection to such interpretations, of course, provided that they are understood as the outcome of the engagement of some readers with the text. But the bishops want far more than this. They are able to derive “what it means” to be male and female, and just from this text! (Thatcher 2005: 21-2)

The writers of the EA report are doing something very similar, pinning their responses to transgender on biblical texts which do not claim to be telling ‘scientific’ truths about human sex. Theology must absolutely defend its capacity to critique modern science and culture, but doing so on the basis of a shoddy bibliolatry gets no-one anywhere. ​[6]​
The EA report comments, ‘A definitive medical “intersex” condition … cannot in our view be considered as in any way comparable to the transsexual claim of wanting to be recognized as really “a man in a woman’s body” or vice versa’ (EA 2000: 66).  But the logic behind this is based solely in the so-called certainty attached to intersex, rather than because of any reflection on the other social and political differences between intersex and transgender. A change of sex on a birth certificates might be legitimate for intersexed people, because there has been a ‘genuine medical mistake’ – not so for transsexuals, says the EA (EA 2000: 87). There do remain important distinctions between transgender and intersex, not least surrounding when genital alteration takes place and on whose terms. However, if the ‘‘transsexual’ issues’ cited above are taken to mean gender identity issues, it would be misleading to ignore the large body of work which suggests that people with intersex conditions sometimes do have queries over their gender of rearing as a direct consequence of attempts to ‘resolve’ their ‘ambiguity’. Even where something is ‘biological’ this does not necessarily render it easily categorizable.

5. Evangelical Alliance: Gender Recognition: A Guide for Churches
The Evangelical Alliance’s 2006 document, Gender Recognition: A Guide for Churches to the Gender Recognition Act (UK), is an attempt briefly to update the lengthier 2000 report, and to explain specifically how the Gender Recognition Act 2004 might impact legally on churches. It was published as a joint venture with Parakaleo Ministry, a Christian organization ‘seeking to uphold Biblical values to the transvestite, transsexual and transgendered person’ (www.parakaleo.co.uk/index.html). According to Parakaleo’s website, this involves mentoring ‘those seeking to re-establish their God given gender identity and destiny’ (www.parakaleo.co.uk/index.html). Although the document is positive in its acceptance of the ‘reality’ of intersex conditions, its desire to distance them from transsexualism again leads to some demarcations between the two being drawn where they do not necessarily exist. For instance: ‘Intersex conditions result from a chromosomal disorder. Transgendered people by definition do not have a chromosomal disorder and therefore show no evidence of physical sexual ambiguity’ (EA 2006: 5). 
Not all intersex conditions do, in fact, arise through chromosomal disorders; it is not only inaccurate for the report to claim they do, but also bizarre, given that the same document later cites a survey of medical literature which acknowledges that at least a portion of intersex conditions have ‘no discernable medical cause’ (EA 2006: 21). The document seems keen to differentiate intersex and transsexualism, on the logic that something with a biological cause cannot be dismissed in the same way as something which has ‘only’ a psychological cause or which is a conscious choice, even if can still be pathologized on other grounds. However, this obsession with the ‘truth’ of biology is nothing but a new essentialism, and does not adequately question what happens when essentialist readings of bodies are allowed to become prescriptive imperatives for how all bodies are to be. Actually, both intersex and transgender as phenomena result from complex interactions between bodies and societies. The ways bodies are read is affected as much by what one expects to see as by the bodies themselves. As Sharon L. Crasnow has commented, 

Since [models] provide an intermediary between world and theory, they are neither world nor theory. However, the theory indicates what sorts of things can count as models of it. The presupposition that there are two sexes is a theoretical presupposition and the models must be constructed so as to fulfil that theoretical claim. We might think of models more clearly as tools with which to think about the world. We need such tools for a variety of reasons, not the least of which is that the world has too much going on in it and we need to make choices about which particular features we should be looking at. Just that recognition alone, however, gives a different slant to what it is that science does. So the theory is describing the model, not the world. (Crasnow 2001: 143)

6. Church of England: Some Issues in Human Sexuality (II): O’Donovan
The 2006 EA document appeared too late to have directly influenced Some Issues, but I now come to a discussion of another author whose work is quoted extensively by the bishops in the latter document: Oliver O’Donovan. O’Donovan’s 1982 Grove booklet on transgender is still one of the most important and considered theological responses to the issue nearly three decades later. Like those who followed him, O’Donovan contrasts intersex with transsexualism, apparently in order to present transsexualism as less legitimate. O’Donovan implies that, as well as threatening the broad integrity of the person, sex reassignment surgery transgresses the givenness of the particular body as it is, so that to redefine the body sculpturally is to take the ‘cult of autonomy’ to extremes. O’Donovan asserts, ‘To know oneself as body is to know that there are only certain things that one can do and be, because one’s freedom must be responsible to a given form, which is the form of one’s own experience in the material world’ (O’Donovan 1982: 15). He insists that sex reassignment surgery goes beyond the limits appropriate for human bodies. O’Donovan is anxious to avoid a body-soul duality, and is suspicious of any surgery not absolutely necessary to the promotion of the integrity of the person. He seems to view transsexual surgery as inherently cosmetic (and thus superfluous) rather than therapeutic. 
Interestingly, however, this response to transgender is not consistently applied. O’Donovan’s logic is not followed through in his reaction to intersex.​[7]​ O’Donovan seems happy to concede that ‘surgery… is appropriate to resolve the ambiguities of the hermaphrodite… The resulting sex… is the real sex of the hermaphrodite. That is to say, it is the sex to which, in view of the ambiguity, it is sensible to assign him’ (O’Donovan 1982: 13). In this instance, ‘real sex’ is accepted as a pragmatic decision-based phenomenon, even though this was rejected in the case of transsexualism. On the one hand, O’Donovan argues that humans are either male or female as made so by God, and cannot choose to change this by subsuming their ‘true’ sex via surgery;​[8]​ yet, on the other, he insists that the true sex of intersexed people is that to which they have been surgically assigned. O’Donovan wishes to refute the argument that individuals could ever find themselves ‘trapped in the wrong body’; rather, he holds, the body they have, sex and all, is an integral part of who they are. However, he legitimates surgery on intersexed bodies to ‘resolve’ their ‘ambiguities’. 
There is an error of reasoning here. J. David Hester comments of O’Donovan’s argument, ‘Apparently, not having an identifiable sex is an emergency and something worth correcting, but having the “wrong” sex is not… This looks to be a serious inconsistency… when what is at stake in both cases is gender assignment’ (Hester 2004: 216). Essentially, O’Donovan is saying that transsexuals can change their sex – that is, subsume all their beliefs about what their sex really is – but only in one direction. So in attempting to resist a body-soul dualism he actually reinscribes it, privileging ‘irreducible’ bodily sex over complex gender identity. The risk here is that those who draw on O’Donovan’s work see the contrasting of ‘biological’ intersex and ‘non-biological’ transgender as a reason to shirk their duty to engage fully with transgender as a real phenomenon. Contrasting intersex and trans on the basis that only one is biological and that only what is biological is ‘real’ leads to falsely dichotomizing them. The sense is that whatever is not biological is not a ‘real’ issue and therefore does not disturb the binary ‘truth’ about human sex and gender. But this is a dangerous path for theologians and the writers of Church documents to tread. 
Moreover, by failing to query or provide a counter-example to O’Donovan’s assertions about intersex (despite acknowledging more open-minded readings of transgender, like those by Watts and Kolakowski – Church of England 2003: 236-8; Kolakowski 1997; Watts 2002), the authors of Some Issues fail to give intersex consideration in its own right. It is only ‘useful’ as a contrast to transgender. The specific issues and experiences of intersex people are not dealt with at all, and the huge implications of the existence of intersex for theological accounts of human sex, gender and sexuality do not even begin to be recognized. This is reprehensible ethically, ecclesiologically, and even eschatologically: human sex is just not as simple as we have been led to believe. Discussing attitudes to so-called ‘hermaphrodites’ in nineteenth-century Britain, the historian and scholar of intersex Alice Dreger comments that doctors considered them mainly as exceptions to the male-or-female rule. She says, ‘Never do they seem to have considered … that the doubt extended far beyond the individual to the endeavor as a whole’ (Dreger 1998: 83). It would be a tragedy if theologians and churchpersons two centuries later continued to perpetuate the same erroneous beliefs. Human bodies cannot incontrovertibly be deemed ‘perfect’, ‘imperfect’, ‘good’, ‘bad’ or ‘fallen’ by other humans without some very serious – and dangerous – leaps of faith going on.

7. Statements From Other Denominations
Although several other Christian denominations based in Britain have produced reports or informal guidelines on human sexuality, these tend to focus predominantly on homosexuality and (in particular) whether or not homosexual individuals are fit to accede to ordination or other forms of church leadership, rather than commenting on transgender. An exception is the 1990 Methodist Report of the Conference Commission on Human Sexuality, which appears strikingly well-researched, generous and forward-looking, particular in contrast with the Church of England’s 1991 Issues. Even in its brief engagement with them, this Methodist report manages to acknowledge transsexualism and various kinds of ‘sexual ambiguity’ (i.e. intersex) in separate paragraphs (137, 138), and does not attempt to conflate or self-consciously contrast them (www.methodist.org.uk/downloads/ne_confcommonhumsexuality1990_0305.rtf). It also recognizes that sexual and gender identity, including transsexual identity, probably arises from a mixture of physical, social and psychological factors, and does so without cancelling this out by a string of conservative, biologically-essentialist dissenting voices as Some Issues does. Most importantly of all, the Methodist statement does not attempt to artificially counterpoint intersex and transgender, and is all the better for it. 
The Roman Catholic Church has not made any public pronouncements on transgender. However, press articles in 2003 pointed to the alleged existence of a confidential 2000 Vatican document which had been sent secretly to the presidents of bishops’ conferences and which outlined the way bishops should respond to transgendered people in their jurisdictions. According to an article by John Norton of the Catholic News Service, archived on the website of the support and activism group Transgender Crossroads, an anonymous source familiar with the document claimed that the Vatican document included the following points:
	Bishops may never alter individuals’ sex as entered in parish baptismal records (Norton 2003). 
	Sex reassignment surgery ‘could be morally acceptable in certain extreme cases if a medical probability exists that it will ‘cure’ the patient’s internal turmoil’ (Norton 2003).
	‘Transsexual’ priests, having undergone psychiatric and spiritual counselling, may ‘continue to exercise their ministry privately if it does not cause scandal’ (Norton 2003). (However, it seems to me that since the document is also said to conclude ‘that those who undergo sex-change operations are unsuitable candidates for priesthood and religious life because of mental instability’ [Norton 2003], it may be that only pre-operative transgendered people are in fact considered able to continue in the priesthood.)
	There is alleged to be ‘a provision giving religious superiors administrative authority to expel a member of the community who has undergone the procedure [i.e. sex reassignment surgery]’ (Norton 2003).
	People who have already undergone transsexual surgery may not enter into marriages, ‘either because they would be marrying someone of the same sex in the eyes of the church or because their mental state casts doubt on their ability to make and uphold their marriage vows’ (Norton 2003). However, marriages where one partner subsequently undergoes sex reassignment surgery do remain valid, ‘unless a church tribunal determines that a transsexual disposition predated the wedding ceremony’ (Norton 2003).

Given the elusive nature of the Vatican document it may be deemed futile to speculate any further on it; and, given that it is not clear whether or not it contains allusion to intersex at all, it rather falls beyond the scope of this paper. However, in light of the experiences of Sally Gross, an intersexed Roman Catholic priest who was no longer allowed to continue in ministry after having transitioned to a feminine gender identity, even though she had undergone no surgery (Gross 1999; van Huyssteen 2003; Coan 2000a, 2000b, 2000c), it may be that the ‘biological’ nature of intersex is not, in the Roman Catholic setting, enough to legitimate it or, conceivably, to make it useful as a foil to transgender. Until such time as the Vatican document enters the public domain, though, any strong conclusions will not be possible.

8. Conclusions
All these documents, with the apparent exception of the Methodist report, contain certain a priori assumptions about the nature of human sex, gender and sexuality. However, if we question the extent to which it is appropriate to hold the ‘natural’ biological and the ‘cultural’ non-biological in contrast at all, it is imperative that these be tested and challenged. Theologians must question the unequivocal nature of ‘goods’ such as procreation, consummation and complementarity which underlie so much teaching on sex. Intersex and transsexualism correspond in their capacity to unnerve, to undermine the unreflective certainty that one knows the appropriate way to respond to given individuals solely on the shaky basis of their secondary characteristics – what Iain Morland has termed ‘cultural genitals’ (Morland 2001: 528). But intersex and transgender differ not predominantly because one is biological/unequivocal and the other is non-biological/uncertain. Intersex, too, has been called a medical, historical and cultural construction, not an ‘evidently’ biological one. For example, Morgan Holmes suggests that ‘if one of the diagnostic criteria for intersexuality is that a patient have genitals that “conflict” with chromosomal sex then it seems, in fact, that genetic males with micropenises who are assigned female are actually made into intersexed persons’ (Holmes 2002: 174). It is therefore odd for Church documents to draw on intersex in order to demonstrate how ‘unreal’ transgender is. 
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^1	  Estimates suggest that around 1 in 2,500 children in Europe and North America is born with an intersex condition – which makes intersex roughly as common as Down’s syndrome or cystic fibrosis (Preves 2003: 2-3). It is difficult to cite exact figures because not all children are diagnosed at birth, and because there is some disagreement about which conditions should actually be classified as intersex conditions (for a full discussion see Preves 2003, especially chapter 2).
^2	  Warnke argues, ‘The concept of race does not hold up as a scientifically viable way of grouping human beings. It does not identify a cluster of genes at the biological level that could serve to sever human beings into neatly separable groups. It does not help identify discrete packages of color and morphology that could separate groups. It is muddled and asymmetrical in its groupings of individuals by ancestry. Finally, while genetic predispositions to certain diseases might provide a more useful way of grouping individuals, at least for medical purposes, such groupings deviate from ordinary uses of the term “race” …[Intersex] surgery raises the question of what our categories of sex are meant to refer to: chromosomes or anatomy? Moreover, if they can refer to either depending on the decisions of teams of doctors, how different, really, are the categories of sex and race? Is assigning a female sex to an infant with one Y chromosome any more securely based in “nature” than assigning a black race to a pinkish infant with one-sixteenth African-American heritage?’ (Warnke 2001: 126, 128).
^3	  Although Holder uses the term ‘hermaphroditism’ rather than ‘intersex’, it is clear that he is referring to a range of intersex conditions, and not solely those involving ovotestes. Although it is now considered archaic, hermaphroditism used to be commonly used as an umbrella term for intersex conditions. Holder is wrong to characterize hermaphroditism solely as the possession of male and female gonads and ambiguous genitalia. In fact, only those who were in the past called ‘true hermaphrodites’ have both ovarian and testicular tissue; most intersexed people do not have both male and female gonads. Nor is it always true that the external genitalia are ambiguous, which is why some intersex conditions are not discovered in childhood. 
^4	  Of course, says Holmes, conditions such as salt-wasting Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia are genuinely pressing medical concerns and should be addressed; however, the health risks attached to some conditions which cause ambiguous genitalia are not identical to the concerns about the unusual-looking genitals themselves, and the two should not be conflated (Holmes 2002: 175). 
^5	  The case for the essential givenness of sex, as argued in the report, goes something like this: Genesis 1:27 demonstrates that Adam and Eve were created male and female, which means that ‘our sexual identity is part of the “givenness” of how we have been made’ (EA 2000: 48). (No sense, then, that the Adam and Eve story might be read parabolically rather than literally, or that ‘sexual identity’ does not always supervene on maleness or femaleness.) The verse emphatically ‘does not teach, as some allege, that maleness and femaleness are two poles between which is a spectrum or ambiguous blend of human sexuality’ (EA 2000: 48). Those who find their gender identity at odds with their genitals must, then, be ‘fundamentally mistaken given the biblical assertion of the priority of the physical’ (EA 2000: 48-9). Transsexuality always falls short of ‘God’s revealed ideal for the expression of sexuality’ (EA 2000: 49) – that is, heterosexual marriage open to the possibility of procreation. Why? Because a marriage involving a post-transition transgendered person will be ‘a deceptive representation of an apparent heterosexual relationship’, which is ‘arguably more subtle and devious than an overt homosexual relationship’ (EA 2000: 50). In sum, ‘The notion of a given, created, dimorphic humankind, as expressed in the book of Genesis, and the sanctity of a complementary relationship between male and female, is fundamental to Christian thought’ (EA 2000: 73).
^6	  Genesis 1 is not the only passage to be treated so unreflectively; the report also states, ‘Because [our sex] is fundamental, it is not an historical phenomenon. It is not subject to development. We do not actually become male or female. Our male/femaleness “unfolds” in a progression from genotype to phenotype. Although this is acknowledged to be a controversial assertion, and some experts who are committed to the development of the concept may well resent rejection of the ‘becoming’ of sexual identity, we nevertheless make our assertion at least in part on the basis of Psalm 139’ (EA 2000: 63-4).
^7	  O’Donovan uses the terminology both of hermaphroditism and, less frequently, intersex, but, like Holder and the EA, does not entirely recognize that the terms are not synonymous. In fact, O’Donovan insists, ‘the term “hermaphrodite”, offensive as it may be, is conceptually truer, suggesting that the condition is one of both-and, arising from a malfunction in the process of differentiation’ (O’Donovan 1982: 7). 
^8	  O’Donovan says, ‘There are, of course, rare syndromes in which one might confess doubt as to the patient’s original relation to the XX/XY alternative… But such a doubt cannot obscure the primary fact that human sexuality at the biological level is dimorphic in intent, and that the only way to understand biological ambiguity, even at the chromosomal level, is as a malfunction in the dimorphic programme’ (O’Donovan 1982: 7). Intersex, then, for O’Donovan, can only ever be a failure in a self-evident project of differentiation. However, this fails to take into account the extent to which science is always already influenced by broader social concerns; the differentiation is patently not self-evident.
